Tag Archives: money for science and research

IS MORE MONEY FOR SCIENCE REALLY NEEDED? PART II.

 

What research gets federal support? Many other recipients are not shown here, and slices of this pie chart do not total 100%! (http://dr-monsrs.net)
What research gets federal support? Many other recipients are not shown here, and slices of this pie chart do not total 100%! (http://dr-monsrs.net)

Every year there is a storm of activity in Congress and the public media about how much money should be appropriated for federal support of science. These activities result in a never-ending upward spiral demanding more and more dollars for research grants. My opinion is that there already is plenty of money for science, and additional funding is not needed!

Since almost nobody except all the taxpayers will agree with my position, this essay examines this critical issue. Part I considered arguments about whether increased funding is, or is not, needed (see: “Part I” ). Part II now discusses several possible changes to increase the amount of dollars available for research support without needing to mandate any increased taxes. Yes, that is feasible! Throughout both parts of this essay I am referring specifically to faculty scientists researching in universities. Background can be found at “Introduction to Money in Modern Scientific Research”, and “Money Now is Everything in Scientific Research at Universities”.

Introduction!

It is a simple fact that there is not sufficient money today to fund research by all the science faculty members at universities. Taxpayers should not be asked to pay higher taxes since they already are paying too much! The only solutions considered for this annual financial problem always are centered on increasing the dollars available for research grants. No-one seems to be examining any alternative and unconventional ways to generate more dollars for scientific research! This article examines 2 direct and effective ways to do that.

The amount of money available to support research can be increased by (1) greatly reducing waste in research grants, and (2) progressively reducing the number of new scientists!

Wastage of research grant awards now is solidly built into both the current research grant system and the universities receiving grants. On the surface, all expenses for any grant-supported project are officially scored as fully justified; in practice, many expenditures either are not spent for actually doing research, or are duplicated, excessive, and unnecessary (see: “Wastage of Research Grant Money in Modern University Science” ).

Another large waste of research grant funds is found in the indirect costs. These expenses are very necessary to pay for cleaning, garbage service, painting, etc., but somehow can be more than 100% of the direct costs for buying test-tubes and running experiments.  Indirect costs are uniquely paid by science faculty with research grant awards; non-science faculty in the same universities usually are not asked to pay for the indirect costs of doing their scholarly work. Thus, my view is that payment for indirect costs by research grants to university scientists is not warranted and wastes grant funds. Nevertheless, the federal granting agencies and universities both approve of this! This peculiar arrangement arouses suspicion that its real purpose is not research support, and must be some hidden objective (see: “Research Grants: What is Going on With the Indirect Costs of Doing Research?” ).

Although everyone can see that there are too many university scientists to be supported with the funds now available,  the production of yet more new science PhD’s every year  directly increases the number of applicants for research grants! In my view, this is crazy, and there now are too many faculty scientists (see: “Does the USA Really Need so Many New Science Ph.D.’s?” )! The number of grant applications submitted is further increased by the hyper-competition for research grant awards, causing many faculty scientists to try to acquire 2 or more grants (see: “All About Today’s Hyper-competition for Research Grants” ). Both these increases make the shortage of research money worsen each year!

My position about wastage of grant money is let’s stop this nonsense so the many dollars freed from being wasted can be used to support the direct costs of worthy research. My position about producing more doctoral scientists is let’s decrease the number of new PhD’s, so the supply/demand imbalance between number of applicants and the amount of dollars available is removed; this reduction will later decrease the total number of faculty scientists.

Discussion and conclusions!  

The policies of both the research grant system and the universities create and encourage the present mess!  Instead of crying out for even more money for science, I sincerely believe it would be much better to increase support funds firstly by stopping the very large wastage of funds awarded by research grants, and secondly by decreasing the number of university scientists applying for research grants.  Both these changes can be accomplished now without disruptions! They will directly remedy the seemingly unsolvable Malthusian problem with needing more and more money for research grants every year.

Why aren’t alternative possibilities being evaluated and discussed? The answer to this unasked question is very easy: the universities and the research grant system both love all their current policies and practices, even though these are very destructive for university science. University scientists are silent and afraid to protest because they will do anything to get their research grant(s) renewed. The research grant officials at federal agencies are silent because they are afraid to challenge and try to change the status quo. This financial situation now is locked in place (see: “Three Money Cycles Support Scientific Research” ).

Two effective models to support scientific research without needing external research grants are available. The ongoing success of self-funding of industrial research works well, does not depend on external research grants, and might have some usable practices that would help the financial problems for university science. Whether further commercialization of science at universities would help improve their financial operations remains to be seen. The very successful internal funding system supporting basic and applied research projects at the Stowers Institute for Medical Research (Kansas City, MO.) provides another good alternative model for escaping from the current malaise (see: “Part II: The Stowers Institute is a Terrific New Model for Funding Scientific Research!” ). Yet other systems for funding scientific research at universities also are of interest here, but are not being actively considered.

My conclusions for Part II are that: (1) the present conditions for federal support of scientific research at universities are very destructive and not sustainable without killing science (see: “Could Science and Research Now be Dying?” ), and, (2) alternative and unconventional means for providing the large pool of dollars needed to pay for scientific research should be more closely examined and discussed.

 

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ALL ABOUT TODAY’S HYPER-COMPETITION FOR RESEARCH GRANTS

 

Hyper-Competition for Research Grants Stimulates the Decay of Science!    (http://dr-monsrs.net)
Hyper-Competition for Research Grants Causes Science to Decay!(http://dr-monsrs.net)

            Today, the effort to acquire more research grant funding is first and foremost for university science faculty.  This daily struggle goes way beyond the normal useful level of competition, and thus must be termed a hyper-competition.  Hyper-competition is vicious because: (1) every research scientist competes against every other scientist for grant funding, (2) an increasing number of academic scientists now are trying to acquire a second or third research grant, (3) absolutely everything in an academic science career now depends upon success in getting a research grant and having that renewed, (4) the multiple penalties for not getting a grant renewal (i.e., loss of laboratory, loss of lab staff, additional teaching assignments, decreased salary, reduced reputation, inability to gain tenured status) often are enough to either kill or greatly change a science faculty career in universities, and, (5) this activity today takes up more time for each faculty scientist than is used to actually work on experiments in their laboratory.

            This system of hyper-competition for research grant awards commonly causes destructive effects.  I previously have touched on some aspects of hyper-competition within previous articles.  In this essay, I try to bring together all parts of this infernal problem so that everyone will be able to clearly perceive its causation and its bad consequences for science, research, and scientists.

How did the hyper-competition for research grants get started? 

            Hyper-competition first grew and increased as a successful response to the declining inflow of money into universities during recent decades (see my recent article in the Money&Grants category on “Three Money Cycles Support Scientific Research”).  The governmental agencies offering grants to support scientific research projects always have tried to encourage participation by more scientists in their support programs, and so were happy to see the resultant increase in the number of applications develop.  Hyper-competition continues to grow today from the misguided policies of both universities and the several different federal granting agencies.

Who likes this hyper-competition for research grants?

            Universities certainly love hyper-competition because this provides them with more profits.  They encourage and try to facilitate its operation in order to obtain even greater profits from their business.  Additionally, universities now measure their own level of academic success by counting the size of external research funding received via their employed science faculty.

            Federal research grant agencies like this hyper-competition because it increases their regulatory power, facilitates their ability to influence or determine the direction of research, and enhances their importance in science.

            Faculty scientists are drawn into this hyper-competition as soon as they find an academic job and receive an initial research grant award.  They then are trapped within this system, because their whole subsequent career depends on continued success with getting research grant(s) renewed.  Although funded scientists certainly like having research grant(s) and working on experimental research, I know that many university scientists privately are very critical of this problematic situation.

What is causing increases in the level of hyper-competition?

             The hyper-competition for research grants, and the resulting great pressure on university scientists, are increased by all of the following activities and conditions.

                        (1)  The number of applications rises due to several different situations: more new Ph.D.s are graduated every year; many foreign doctoral scientists immigrate to the USA each year to pursue their research career here; universities encourage their successful science faculty to acquire multiple grant awards; the faculty are eager to get several research grant awards in order to obtain security in case one of their grants will not be renewed; and, the research grant system is set up to make research support awards for relatively short periods of time, thereby increasing the number of applications submitted for renewed support in each 10 year period.

                    (2)  Hard-money faculty salaries increasingly depend upon the amount of money brought in by research grant awards, and the best way to increase that number is to acquire additional grants.

                        (3)  The number of regular science faculty with soft-money salaries is rising.  Since only very few awards will support 100% of the soft-money salary level, this situation necessitates acquiring several different research grants.

                        (4)  Professional status as a member of the science faculty and as a university researcher now depends mainly on how many dollars are acquired from research grant awards.  The more, the merrier!

                        (5)  Academic status and reputation of departments and universities now depends mainly on how many dollars are acquired from research grant awards.   The more, the merrier!

                        (6)  In periods with decreased economic activity, appropriations of tax money sent to federal granting agencies tend to either decrease or stop increasing.  This means that more applicants must compete for fewer available dollars.  In turn, this results in a greater number of worthy awardees receiving only partial funding for their research project; the main way out of this frustrating situation is to apply for and win additional research grants.

What effects are produced by the hyper-competition for research grant awards? 

             It might be thought that greater competition amongst scientists would have the good effect of increasing the quality and significance of new experimental findings, since the scientists succeeding with this system should be better at research.  That proposition is theoretically possible, but is countered by all the bad effects produced by this system (see below).  I believe the funding success of some scientists only shows that they are better at business, rather than being better at science.  I know of no good effects coming from the hyper-competition for research grant awards.

            Several different bad effects of hyper-competition on science and research now can be identified as coming from the intense and extensive struggle to win research grant awards.

(1)  Science becomes distorted and even perverted.  Science and research at academic institutions now are business activities.  The chief purpose of hiring university scientists now is to make more financial profits for their employer (see my early article in the Scientists category on “What’s the New Main Job of Faculty Scientists Today?”); finding new knowledge and uncovering the truth via research are only the means towards that end.

(2)  The integrity of science is subverted by the hyper-competition for research grants.  The consequences of losing research funding are so great that it is very understandable that more and more scientists now eagerly trying to obtain a research grant award become willing to peek sideways, instead of looking straight ahead (see my earlier article in the Big Problems category on “Why would any Scientist ever Cheat?”).  There are an increasing number of recent cases known where corruption and cheating arose specifically as a response to the enormous pressures generated on faculty by the hyper-competition for research grant awards (see my article in the Big Problems category on “Important Article by Daniel Cressey in 2013 Nature: “ ‘Rehab’ helps Errant Researchers Return to the Lab”).

(3)  Seeking research grant awards now takes up much too much time for research scientists employed at universities.  This occupies even more faculty time than is used to conduct research experiments in their lab (see my article in the Scientists category on “Why is the Daily Life of Modern University Scientists so very Hectic?”)!

(4)  Because the present research grant system is defective, the identity of successful scientists has changed and degenerated such that several very unpleasant questions now must be asked (e.g., Is the individual champion scientist with the most dollars from research grant awards primarily a businessperson or a research scientist?  Should graduate students in science now also be required to take courses in business administration?  What happens if someone is a very good researcher, but has no skills or interests in finances and business?  Could some scientist be a superstar with getting research grant awards, but almost be a loser with doing experimental research?).

(5)  If ethical misbehavior becomes more common because it is stimulated by hyper-competition , then could “minor cheating in science” become “the new normal”?  Integrity is essential for research scientists, but the number of miscreants seems to be increasing.

(6)  Inevitably, younger science faculty working in this environment with hyper-competition start asking themselves, “Is this really what I wanted to do when I worked to become a professional scientist?” The increasing demoralization of university science faculty is growing to become quite extensive.

            Grantspersonship refers to a strong drive in scientists to obtain more research grant awards by using whatever it takes to become successful in accomplishing this goal (see my recent article in the Money&Grants category on “Why is ‘Grantspersonship’ a False Idol for Research Scientists, and Why is it Bad for Science?”).  Grantspersonship and hyper-competition both are large drivers of finances at universities.   The Research Grant Cycle is based on the simple fact that more grant awards mean greater profits to universities (see my recent article in the Money&Grants category on “Three Money Cycles Support Scientific Research”).  The hyper-competition in The Research Grant Cycle is very pernicious, since the primary goal of research scientists becomes to get the money, with doing good research being strictly of secondary importance.  Grantspersonship sidetracks good science and good scientists.

What do the effects of hyper-competition lead to? 

            All the effects of the current hyper-competition for research grant awards are bad and primarily mean that: (1)  science at universities is just another business; (2)  the goal of scientific research has changed from finding new knowledge and valid truths, into acquiring more money; (3)  the best scientist and the best university now are identified as that one which has the largest pile of money; (4)  corruption and dishonesty in science are being actively caused and encouraged by the misguided policies of universities and the research grant agencies; and, (5)  researchers now are being forced to waste very much time with non-research activities.  Hyper-competition thus results in more business and less science, more corruption and less integrity, more wastage of time and money, and, more diversion of science from its true purpose.  It is obvious to me that all of these consequences of hyper-competition are very bad for science, bad for research in academia, and, bad for scientists.

Can anything be done to change the present hyper-competition for research grants? 

            The answer to this obvious question unfortunately seems to be a loud, “No”!  The status quo always is hard to change, even when it very obviously is quite defective or counterproductive.  Both universities and granting agencies love this hyper-competition for research grant awards, and this destructive system now is very firmly entrenched in modern universities and modern experimental science.

            Big changes are needed in the policies of educational institutions and of federal agencies offering research grants.  Until masses of faculty scientists and interested non-scientists are willing to stand up and demand these changes, there will only be more hyper-competition, more corruption, more wasted time and money, and, more wasted lives.  In other words, science and research will continue to decay.

Concluding remarks

            Hyper-competition for research grant awards in universities now dominates the academic life of all science faculty members doing research.  Although it pleases universities and the research grant agencies, this hyper-competition subverts integrity and honesty, changes the goal of scientific research, wastes very much time for faculty scientists, and sidetracks science from its traditional role and importance.

            I know that many dedicated scientists on academia accept this perverse condition because they are successful in getting funded and want to stay funded.  Winners in the hyper-competition for research grant awards would not dare to ever give a negative opinion about this system, for fear of losing their blessed status.  They justify their position by stating that they would never cheat, they are too good at their research to ever be turned down for a grant renewal, and their university employer definitely wants them to continue their good research work.  It is sad that many will find out only when it is too late that they are very mistaken and very expendable.

 

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THREE MONEY CYCLES SUPPORT SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

 The Research Grant Cycle at Universities   (http://dr-monsrs.net)

The Research Grant Cycle at Modern Universities   (http://dr-monsrs.net)


            Modern research with laboratory experiments is very costly for universities, research institutes, and industrial centers (see my earlier article in the Basic Introductions category on “Introduction to Money in Modern Scientific Research”).  Without financial support, research investigations are either impossible or severely limited.  Most funding for scientific research in the USA comes from commercial companies and the taxpaying public (via grants from several agencies of the national government).  If one steps back and looks at the overall processes whereby funds to support scientific research activities are generated, several different money cycles become apparent.
                    (1) The Business Profit Cycle provides funds for research and development (R&D) in industrial settings.                                                                                                                                             (2) The Soft Money Cycle supplies funds to support experimental studies at research institutes, and, some large universities and hospitals.
                    (3) The Research Grant Cycle generates funds for laboratory investigations at modern universities. 

             All 3 money cycles have the general features that a relatively small input of money starts and maintains the cycle, which later produces an output of research findings (i.e., science) and additional money (i.e., profits).  The scientists function in these cycles as a catalyst to make this conversion from input into output.  An amazing ability of these 3 cycles is that all grow with time and become self-supporting.  I now will briefly describe and explain how each of these 3 cycles operates, so that both the general public and employed scientists will have a greater understanding about how modern laboratory research is being funded.

The Business Profit Cycle

            Large industries must develop new and improved products through research and engineering efforts, so as to increase their financial profits.  A portion of their total annual profits is designated for R&D work by scientists and engineers, and is used to pay for the needed personnel, instrumentation, and supplies.  Marketing of the new or improved commercial products then generates increased sales and additional profits; this output enables both rewards for the private or public owners, and an enlarged pool of money to pay for an increased amount of future R&D.  Thus, for a successful company, the profits and the number of investigations both grow bigger with time, and their Business Profit Cycle becomes self-supporting.  History clearly shows that money from this ongoing cyclic operation is very successful for enabling industrial R&D activities. 

 The Soft-Money Cycle

            Research institutes, large universities, and some hospital centers have full-time staff scientists who receive a salary exclusively from their research grant(s).  This is termed a soft-money salary, and differs from the hard-money salary of most university science faculty (i.e., their salary is guaranteed by some source, such as a state government).  Typically, staff scientists with soft-money positions are not eligible to receive academic tenure, and do not have teaching obligations.  In general, these scientists work in a circumscribed research area (i.e., as part of a focused group effort), have very specific job duties (e.g., operation of a complex special research instrument that provides data used by other researchers), or are successfully investigating some very hot topic.  The input for The Soft Money Cycle is research grant money, and the main output is science (i.e., published research results).  Scientists function to convert the input into the output via their research activities.  This soft-money cycle works quite well for supporting scientific research activities at some prominent research institutions. 

            In all cases, scientists with soft-money salaries enter their job with full knowledge that their continued employment directly depends upon their success in obtaining research grant renewals.  Due to the present hyper-competition for research grant awards (see my earlier article in the Scientists category on “Why Would any Scientist ever Cheat?”), a certain number of soft-money researchers each year must terminate their employment as a scientist.  Not everything in this situation is bad, since soft-money salaries more frequently are not so restricted as hard-money salaries, and even can include some bonuses.  The soft-money scientists that continue to produce good research results and high quality publications actually do have some job security without needing to be tenured. 

The Research Grant Cycle

            Modern universities mostly now have become just another business (see my earlier article in the Big Problems category on “What is the Very Biggest Problem for Science Today?”).  University profits are cold hard cash, and traditionally are obtained from several quite different sources: donations by alumni and corporations, income from endowments, ever-increasing tuition fees obtained from enrolled undergraduate and graduate students, and, portions of research grant money brought in by their science faculty.  For The Research Grant Cycle, the input is research grant money, and the output is science (i.e., published research reports) plus university profits (i.e., awarded grant money that has not been spent).  The Research Grant Cycle is successful because it both supports research by the science faculty and provides universities with profits. 

             The greater the number and size of research grant awards acquired, the larger are a university’s profits.  To fully understand this statement, it is necessary that readers comprehend what is meant here by “profits”.  University profits include the total funds entering a university,  which are not fully needed and used to pay for salaries and expenses of some designated group of employees (e.g., administrators, housekeeping staff, librarians, police department, secretaries, teachers, etc.), or for some specific activities (e.g., advertising and publicity, bookkeeping, painting, receiving deliveries of new purchases, safety office, etc.).  In other words, if total income exceeds actual expenses, then there is a net positive profit. 

            University profits in any single year include the following typical examples. 
                        (1) The sum of all tuition fees minus the actual expenditures for classroom maintenance, course handouts, faculty instructors, heating and air-conditioning, printing of course examinations, teaching assistants, etc.  Any net positive balance here is a profit. 
                        (2) Income from investments of endowed resources, minus all the costs for administration, bookkeeping, brokerage services, financial consultants, money transfers, etc.  Any net positive balance here is a profit. 
                       (3) Total research grant awards, minus actual payments for approved expenses with direct and indirect costs, financial bookkeeping, grant administration, purchases, salaries, travel, etc.  Any net positive balance here is a profit. 
All these profits initially are transferred into some special institutional budgets (e.g., Dean’s slush fund, fund for new building construction, fund for special programs, institutional emergency fund, reserve fund for future usage, unencumbered funds, etc.).  

 Can the Profit Level of The Research Grant Cycle be Increased? 

             Operation of the Research Grant Cycle at universities is diagrammed in the figure shown just under the title of this article.  This now has been expanded by the incorporation of certain features described above for The Soft Money Cycle.  By hiring some science faculty as soft-money appointments instead of into the usual hard-money positions, universities save very much money because they no longer need to provide salaries.   The reduced expenses readily enable the generation of greater net profits by The Research Grant Cycle. 

             I suspect that another new source of additional profits involves that portion of research grants awarded to pay for indirect costs (i.e., expenses for cleaning, heating and air conditioning, painting, safety, etc.).  For the necessary background, please see my recent article in the Money & Grants category on “What is Going on With the Indirect Costs of Doing Research?”.  Any profits coming from unused indirect cost awards can be used to enlarge the standard operation of The Research Grant Cycle, and/or diverted to pay for other university activities.  If I am correct about the use and misuse of indirect cost awards, the amount of extra profits could be quite large.  Universities undoubtedly have several responses always ready to counter any inquiries or allegations about whether their actual expenses are much less than the costs in their approved budget: (1) black and white documents giving work schedules and listing the activities performed, (2) entries in official accounting documents showing that all indirect cost funds were spent completely and exactly as planned, and (3) a signed agreement with the funding agencies about approved costs, coming from the earlier negotiations establishing a university’s indirect cost rate.  However, a paper document does not necessarily mean that listed work actually was done, or that the actual service activities described really do cost as much as their stated values.  Based upon my personal experiences, I simply say “bunk” to such “proofs” for their stated indirect expenses! 

How do the Money Cycles Actually Function? 

             All 3 different money cycles produce profits that support scientific research activities.  The 2 money cycles at research institutes and universities can be initiated as soon as the available institutional funds become sufficient to permit hiring only one new scientist on a soft-money salary.  This faculty member then wins a new research grant and also gains his or her new salary.  After initial success, this faculty researcher then is encouraged to obtain a second grant, publish many research reports, and submit strong applications for competitive renewals.  The total profits generated from this initial employee will enlarge the pool of unrestricted university funds, thereby ultimately permitting the hiring of some additional soft-money faculty scientists.  With time, this cadre grows further and the Research Grant Cycle becomes self-supporting (i.e., research grants of the employed scientists provide enough income to give a net profit level that more than pays for all the costs of operating this cycle).  The use of soft-money salaries also means that the universities never have any worries about what to do if a research grant unexpectedly is not renewed; any time that an annual soft-money contract is completed, the employing university simply can discharge the now unfunded scientist, and then hire a replacement. 

             Once any of the 3 money cycles starts operating, they then simply go around and around while generating more and more profits.  With good administrative management, the number of people generating profits grows each and every year, and the cycle gets bigger and better!  In some cases, the speed of cyclic rotation even gets faster!  For all 3 money cycles, profits and the size of the cycle become larger and stronger with time! 

            For modern universities, a self-sustaining and growing new source of money profits has been discovered!  Once functioning, only minimal further expenses are needed to maintain this ongoing cycle!  The universities surely are overjoyed!  Since universities have become just another business, the financially productive Research Grant Cycle now is strongly embedded within modern university operations.  The success of The Research Grant Cycle in generating profits explains why medical schools often are the very largest unit at modern large universities; this condition has little directly to do with diseases, new therapeutic treatments, public health, or clinical research, and everything to do with obtaining larger profits. 

Does The Research Grant Cycle Actually Operate at Modern Universities? 

             What is the evidence that this cyclic profit-generating system really exists in universities?  Although there are several pieces of suggestive evidence, definitive proof remains lacking because so much is kept hidden and/or is off the record.  Recent conditions suggesting this operation at universities include: (1) the number of soft-money science faculty holding positions as non-tenure-track employees in universities is increasing, (2) at any time, there now are quite a few individual doctoral scientists available for hire in the USA as soft-money employees, (3) new very large programs (e.g., clinical genomics research initiatives, participation in extra-terrestrial space science studies, nanoscience research institutes, etc.) now have been developed in universities, and many have received substantial funding support with very large research grant awards, and, (4) even though every year there always seems to be only limited funds available for federal support of science, new government-mandated projects and mission-based research efforts continue to be announced along with special funding programs to support them.  Any new initiatives and funding programs all engage The Research Grant Cycle fully, and actually stimulate its functioning. 

 Concluding Remarks

            All 3 of the money cycles do provide the financial support needed for modern scientific investigations in the different employing institutions.  The Research Grant Cycle certainly is considered to be totally good by the many parties benefitting from it.  After the recent period with declining income due to economic downturns, universities must be especially delighted to have found a new very fruitful profit-generating mechanism to fund their many activities and services.  

             With all those positive features of The Research Grant Cycle, why then do I have a negative opinion about it?  There are 3 main reasons for my viewpoint.
                    (1)  First, my biggest reason is that this type of profit-driven money cycle subverts scientific research by making getting research grant money the chief goal of the science faculty, rather than producing new knowledge and new concepts from their experimental investigations.  The money is made to be more important than the science.  This shift in values directly stimulates the current abominable hyper-competition for research grant awards. 
                    (2)  Second, it forces scientists to become business entities, rather than professional researchers and scholars trying to better the world through their investigations.  Basic research especially is affected negatively, since it initially has no obvious commercial importance. 
                    (3)  Third, it amplifies the increasing commercialization of university science (see my earlier article in the Big Problems category on “What is the Very Biggest Problem for Science Today?”).  The Research Grant Cycle reinforces the new identity of universities as businesses, rather than as centers for academic scholarship, scientific research, teaching, innovation, and public service.  That new identity in turn encourages corruption and downgrades the traditional role of universities in society. 

 

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